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Abstract
Firms typically decide their financing before starting the implementation of a new
project. The firm’s management may become more pessimistic about the project’s prof-
itability after financing is raised and reduce spending accordingly. Following an unpre-
dicted negative aggregate productivity shock, the productive sector can enter a low spend-
ing mode, thus depressing output further. I use firm-level financial data to provide some
empirical justification for this mechanism. I then study the mechanism in a general equilib-
rium model with money and a supply sector subject to uninsured idiosyncratic productivity
shocks. The model reproduces many features of the post-2008 period: large effects of real
shocks on output and investment, a less effective expansive monetary policy that is accom-
panied by high shareholders cash payouts.
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1 Introduction
The 2008 Great Recession is associated with the bursting of the American housing
bubble. The drop in house prices, combined with leverage effects, wiped out a large
proportion of the wealth of households in the United States, leading to a decrease
in consumer demand. The banking sector was also heavily exposed to the housing
market through asset-backed securities. The deterioration in banks’ balance sheet
that followed the collapse in the value of mortgage-backed securities dented the con-
fidence in the banking sector in a process that culminated with the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. This led to a rationing of bank credit available
to non-financial firms and increased their financing costs. The drop of aggregate
output that followed was both rapid and significant. The Federal Reserve as well
as other major central banks reacted swiftly to this chain of events. Short-term in-
terest rates were set to zero and central banks’ balance sheets were used to engage
in large scale purchase programs aimed at replenishing and stabilising the balance
sheet of banks and restoring the flow of credit. By spring 2009, the Federal Reserve
stress tests concluded that commercial banks had adequate levels of capital relative
to assets, signalling the end of the financial crisis. The trough of the cycle occurred
shortly after. However, the recovery that followed was slow. In the words of the
European Investment Bank (2016) investment and investment finance report, ”the
slowness of the recovery in investment by firms [was] disturbing, particularly given
the extraordinary monetary stimulus. The continued decline in returns to firm in-
vestment suggests that action is needed to raise productivity growth”. The corporate
sector used the availability of credit to bolster its cash positions but investments in
hiring and new capital did not follow. In its report on the use of corporate cash flow
(King and Larach (2016)), the Federal Reserve of Chicago notes that ”business fixed
investment has continued to be sluggish [...] corporate distributions to shareholders
have remained near record levels [while] U.S. corporations are holding historically
high quantities of liquid assets”.
This paper considers the role of money as a store of value that might become more
appealing to firms than investing in the production process when large unpredicted
negative shocks affect the rates of profit. I embed this mechanism in a general
equilibrium model that reproduces some of the stylised facts discussed above, namely:
a more volatile business cycle and a traditional expansive monetary policy with
muted effects on the real economy and that is accompanied by large cash transfers
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to corporate shareholders.
In real terms, money deteriorates in value with inflation, but this is less of an issue
when inflation is low for an extended period of time while uncertainty regarding the
performance of other riskier investments is high. Whatever the level of inflation, as
one of the safest ways to store value, money provides a lower limit on the return
of viable investments from the perspective of rational, profit maximising agents. At
the financing stage, firms target a higher return on investment than the one offered
by simply keeping money in their cash accounts. In normal situations, the gross
nominal returns on investment targeted by firms are higher than the return provided
by cash –i.e. one– as these returns need to be large enough to cover the firm’s cost of
financing. Investors financing the firm activity (shares and bonds holders) also expect
a positive return on investment. Investor rewards, seen as a financing cost from the
firm’s perspective, represents a lower bound to the expected return on the projects
the firm is undertaking for these projects to be considered worthwhile by a rational
manager maximizing the firm’s profit. Following unexpected drops in productivity
between the financing stage and the time of spending, the firm can decide to spend
less than the previously set financing. This happens when the marginal return to the
firm from producing at maximum capacity (i.e., using all the funds available from
the financing stage) is lower than the return generated by simply redistributing cash
back to investors (i.e., one).
I study this underspending mechanism in the context of a monetary general equi-
librium with money in the utility function (MIU) and a supply sector with hetero-
geneous productivities. The fluctuations in the model are driven by an exogenous
aggregate productivity process common to all firms, firm-level idiosyncratic produc-
tivities and fluctuations in the supply of money. The main innovation is that the
financing problem facing the firm is considered separately from its spending prob-
lem. This gives the management of the firm a more realistic economic agency as
they exert their control over the cash raised at the financing stage. Similarly to
the working capital model in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), firms need to raise
financing that covers the cost of labour and capital before the start of the produc-
tion cycle. Each firm decides its level of financing first. The financing decision is
a result of maximising expected profits, considering the prevailing financing costs,
the signal available to the firm about its own future productivity and its expectation
about future aggregate productivity and prices. Once financing is raised, the level
of financing serves as a cap for future production spending. Unlike in other work-
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ing capital models, this spending constraint can be relaxed. The constraint holds
as long as the firm’s productivity does not drop below initial expectations by more
than an amount that is tied to the previously set financing costs. As a result, a large
portion of the productive sector can reduce (increase) spending immediately follow-
ing unexpected negative (positive) shocks to aggregate productivity. This can make
the effect of real shocks more immediate and more severe. In the studied monetary
set-up, a positive shock to money supply can increase firms’ financing and there-
fore increase future firms’ spending, thus increasing labour, investments and output.
This liquidity effect is moderated by the underspending mechanism as the spending
of the financially unconstrained firms does not react to the more favourable credit
conditions. The studied mechanism contributes to muting the effects of expansive
monetary policies.
The mechanism studied in this paper can contribute to understanding the large
drop in output in 2008. Given the way my model is set up, this requires a drop
in aggregate productivity. Fernald (2014) has documented an important decline
in total factor productivity (TFP) growth between 2005 and 2008. More recent
productivity data published by the Bureau of Labour Statistics indicate a decline in
utilisation-adjusted TFP growth after the end of the recession. In addition, other
factors contributing to an unexpected deterioration in firms’ profits can achieve a
similar effect and push firms to spend less than previously raised financing. For
example, a sudden collapse of consumer demand following a deterioration in the
households’ net worth as in Mian and Sufi (2012) can play a similar role to unexpected
drops in productivity. Furthermore, the model’s mechanism is studied in a set-up
where credit is not rationed. The reason for this choice is two-fold. First, it has
been documented that larger corporates with direct access to credit took advantage
of this access and tapped the bond market to counteract the decline in bank lending
in the early stages of the Great Recession. As a result, these firms could maintain
stable overall debt levels throughout the credit cycle (Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2012)).
Furthermore, as mentioned above, liquidity was readily available after the early stages
of the Great Recession with no significant recovery in terms of output growth. The
studied mechanism can therefore contribute to understanding the collapse in output
by firms that maintained access to credit markets in the early stages of the Great
Recession while providing a potential explanation to the slow recovery that followed
the financial crisis.
The model also suggests that when firms are less productive or face less attractive
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investment opportunities, they tend to distribute part of the excess cash to share-
holders. To present some empirical validation of this claim, I build on the work of
Fama and French (2001), Grullon and Michaely (2004) and others and study the
relationship between the firm’s productivity and the level of cash it diverts towards
shareholders in the form of dividends and share buybacks. It has been widely doc-
umented by corporate finance literature that firms that invest in their production
process through research and development, capital expenditure or hirings tend to
distribute less cash to shareholders. The empirical work in this paper provides fur-
ther confirmation of this while focusing on the impact of total factor productivity. I
find that firms with low total factor productivity are more likely to distribute cash
to shareholders and that they tend to distribute more cash relative to their size, as
measured by market capitalisation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies the empirical evidence pro-
vided by dividends and share buybacks. The general equilibrium model is set out in
section 3. This section also provides several theoretical results related to the model’s
main mechanism and deals with technical issues related to the occasionally binding
financing constraints. Section 4 presents the simulation results. Further theoretical
and empirical results are presented in the appendix.
Related Literature.— The empirical part of this work builds on the existing fi-
nance literature concerned with explaining the levels of cash distributed by firms
towards shareholders. These cash distributions take two important forms: dividends
and share buybacks. Jensen (1986) argues that, when the firm is facing less attrac-
tive investment opportunities, a conflict of interest arises between shareholders and
managers, with the latter having an incentive to keep more resources under their
control and thus not distributing free cash flows. Share repurchases in this context
can work as a way to reassure markets about this potential conflict of interests.
Grullon and Michaely (2004) find that repurchasing firms reduce their current lev-
els of capital expenditures and research and development expenses and that their
cash balances significantly decline. This corroborates the deterioration of the invest-
ment opportunities hypothesis. They also find that, contrary to what is suggested
by the signalling hypothesis, the markets do not always react positively to the an-
nouncement of share repurchases, as market participants are not always aware of the
reduction of investments opportunities available to the firm before the share buyback
programme is announced. Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006) show that there is
a strong discontinuity in the probability of accretive share repurchases around the
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consensus earnings per share (EPS) expected by financial analysts. Firms that would
have narrowly missed the analysts’ consensus EPS are much more likely to increase
their share repurchase activity in the goal of positively affecting their EPS and meet-
ing the consensus than those who narrowly beat the consensus EPS. Almeida, Fos,
and Kronlund (2016) exploit this discontinuity to show that EPS-motivated share
buybacks are associated with reductions in employment and investments. Fama and
French (2001) focus on the more usual way chosen by firms to divert cash towards
shareholders: dividends. They study the decline in the distribution of dividends by
publicly traded firms in the last 20 years of the twentieth century and relate the
said decline to many contributing factors including a change in the characteristics
of public firms (firms go public earlier in their development process) and the emer-
gence of competing ways to pay shareholders (mainly share buybacks). The authors
also document an empirical inverse relationship between the firms’ propensity to pay
dividends and the investment opportunity it faces. Since the early 80s, share repur-
chases make a significant part of the cash flows directed by firms towards investors.
I, therefore, construct an index combining both dividends and cash repurchases to
account for all cash flows directed towards equity investors as opposed to those being
invested in the production processes. This follows the literature concerned with the
total cash flow distributed by firms to equity investors. Bagwell and Shoven (1989)
give an early account of the increasing roles of share redistribution and take-overs as
ways to distribute cash from firms towards equity investors and suggest that yields
of return on equity investments should account for these ways of cash distribution.
Robertson and Wright (2006) use a total cash flow index that takes into account
dividends, share repurchases and net share issues, and use the constructed index to
predict stock returns. Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014) use total factor productivity
(TFP) to predict equity returns and show that while TFP underperforms other indi-
cators such as the market to book ratio in predicting equity returns, low productivity
firms earn a significant premium over high productivity firms in the following year.
In this paper, I use various firm indicators to explain the propensity of firms to divert
cash towards shareholders. Following existing literature, these indicators include in-
vestments in capital, research and development and employment. In this regard, my
results provide further validation of the idea that firms react to lower investment
opportunities by diverting cash towards shareholders. To provide an empirical foun-
dation to the mechanism presented in this paper, I show that besides the investment
indicators, total factor productivity helps predict the levels of cash diverted to eq-
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uity investors. To this effect, I present evidence from repeated cross-sectional logit
regressions documenting the propensity of firms to pay shareholders. Additionally,
I present dynamic panel data regressions explaining the size of the payout when the
firm decides to pay.
This paper explores a firm based financial mechanism while abstracting from the
issues related to the inability of agents to raise debt as a result of the worsening in the
value of the asset they use as collateral (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke and
Gertler (1989) and others). Many authors documented and discussed the role of this
sort of financial frictions in the context of the great recession (e.g. Hall (2011) and
Mian and Sufi (2012)). I view the present work as complementary to this literature
as I explore the consequences of a sudden drop in TFP on the behaviour of firms that
do not suffer from a credit constraint and explore the macroeconomic repercussions
of such behaviour.
I assume that firms have to finance the production costs before engaging in pro-
duction. This hypothesis is similar to what is assumed in the working capital models
such as in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and Cooley and Quadrini (2006). I
also draw on this literature when setting monetary policy: the central bank injects
new money in the financial intermediaries to increase the supply of loans available
to the production sector. The increase in the money supply is therefore not dis-
tributed equally to all agents, which guarantees a role for money in the model’s
fluctuations. However, I depart from this literature when setting the demand for
money. Instead of using a Cash In Advance constraint (CIA) to generate a demand
for cash from households, I adopt a Money In the Utility function approach (MIU)
to generate demand from households for holding cash. The household demand is
complemented by the demand for cash emanating from the firms’ financing needs.
The approach I adopt for modelling money provides a more realistic form for the
demand for money by households and, unlike CIA approaches, does not prevent the
underspending mechanism from operating by muting the fluctuations of the firm’s
revenue.
The studied mechanism provides a potential motivation for the firm to cut spend-
ing despite abundant credit by considering the role of money as a store of value.
Although hitting the interest rates Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) is not important to the
functioning of the model, the motivation for firms to underinvest in the production
process is stronger when nominal interest rates are low. The underspending mecha-
nism studied here can be loosely described as a firm based liquidity trap. This con-
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nects this work to the literature explaining the slow recovery after the GFC through
liquidity traps such as in Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017) where the authors build a
Bewley-Aiyagari-Hugget type model with households that are subject to a reduction
in their borrowing limit. Constrained consumers are then forced to reduce debt and
unconstrained consumer have an incentive to increase their precautionary savings.
This creates a powerful downward pressure on interest rates. Interest rates decrease
sharply as a result and this pushes the economy into a liquidity trap. Eggertsson
and Krugman (2012) argue that following a ”Minsky moment” where agents realise
that debt levels are too high, an aggressive deleveraging cycle begins. This decreases
prices and triggers a Fisher debt-deflation cycle. Bacchetta, Benhima, and Kalantzis
(2019) build a monetary model with assets scarcity and use it to show that a liquid-
ity trap caused by a persistent deleveraging shock, increases real cash holdings and
decreases investment and output in the medium term. The authors argue that quan-
titative easing can lead to a deeper liquidity trap, while a higher government debt
can ease assets’ scarcity, helping to exit the liquidity trap, but may harm investment
in the medium term. While the underspending mechanism I study becomes stronger
when interest rates are low, hitting the lower zero bound is not crucial for its func-
tioning. The same applies to credit constraints that are often assumed in liquidity
trap models to limit the borrower’s demand for financing. In the model presented
here, I do not assume any form of credit rationing and still establish situations where
agents prefer cash to real investments. This is achieved by considering the faith of the
cash transferred to the borrowing firm when productivity unexpectedly deteriorates
between the time financing is raised and the time of production.
2 Empirical evidence
In this section, I present an empirical foundation for the main mechanism of the
model. The model’s mechanism assumes that firms finance production before using
the funds raised to pay for production costs. If the firm’s productivity unexpectedly
drops between the financing stage and the spending stage, the management of the
firm can choose to cancel some of its spending plans made at the financing stage and
return a portion of the cash raised to investors without investing it in the production
process. To provide an empirical foundation for such mechanism, one would ideally
need a way to measure changes in the spending intentions of firms, associate these
changes of intention with an increase of the cash diverted towards shareholders and
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link this process to a worsening in the firm’s productivity. The data available to me
does not provide a way to measure such a change in the firm’s spending intentions.
I, therefore, focus on the cash diverted towards investors instead. I construct a mea-
sure of the overall cash diverted towards shareholders that includes both dividends
and share buybacks (”Distributed Cash”). I then document the marginal effect of
total factor productivity and other growth indicators on the propensity to divert
cash towards shareholders using cross-sectional logit regressions repeated for every
year of the studied sample period. I assume that an increase in shareholder payout
beyond what can be explained by the relevant firm’s characteristics and cash flow
figures signals a reduction in the firm appetite towards spending. Thus, an inverse
marginal relationship between productivity and ”Distributed Cash” is an indication
of a positive marginal relationship between productivity and production spending.
To confirm and strengthen the results from the cross-sectional logit regressions, I run
a dynamic fixed effect panel data regression explaining the size of the payout made
by firms choosing to distribute some cash to shareholders.
2.1 Cash distributed to equity holders
Firms can divert cash towards shareholders in different manners. The method chosen
depends, among other things, on the intended recipients, the aim behind the distri-
bution and its tax implications. Namely, firms distribute cash to ordinary equity
holders through two important channels:
• Dividends are the most common way for a firm to distribute cash to sharehold-
ers. They are subject to corporate taxation and taxes on revenue. Dividends
are typically paid periodically. This implies that starting to pay dividends or
increasing their amount creates an expectation of such behaviour continuing in
the future.
• Firms can decide to buy back their own shares (Share Buybacks). This
can happen through fixed price tender offers, and since 1982 mostly through
open market operations.1 After selling all or part of their shares, ordinary
equity holders are subject to taxes on capital gains. Capital gains tax rates are
1The 10b-18 rule of 1982 provides guarantees to the firms willing to repurchased their own stock that they
would not be in breach of stock manipulation rules if they adhere to certain conditions (Safe Harbor condi-
tions) regarding the manner, timing, price and size of the repurchase. This regulation and others implemented
around the same time period simplified the execution of share buybacks and limited the legal liability facing the
repurchasing firm.
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typically lower than revenue tax rates, they exclude the cost at which the shares
were bought and can be netted against capital losses from other investments by
the seller. Share repurchases are therefore at a significant advantage relative to
dividends from a tax perspective.
Following the more lenient 1982 regulations, share buybacks have emerged in the
mid 1980s as a major way to compensate equity holders beside dividend payments.
The left panel of figure 1 illustrates this trend and shows the evolution of the average
yearly share repurchases versus the annual dividends over time in the sample provided
by Compustat for firms based in the United States. The right panel of figure 1 also
shows that from the early 1970s a significant number of firms chose to buy their own
stock back while not distributing dividends. Taking into consideration both dividends
and share buybacks is therefore important when studying how firms decide to divert
cash towards shareholders.2
Figure 1: Evolution over time of the average amount distributed through dividends and share buybacks in log
format by U.S. firms covered by Compustat (left). Proportion of Compustat U.S. firms with positive cash return
to equity holders through: dividends, share buybacks and a combination of the dividend and share buybacks
(right). Grey areas indicate NBER recession periods. Appendix B.1 explains how share buybacks are derived
and other data treatments.
2Firms can also distribute cash towards equity holders through cash financed mergers and acquisitions. I will
not focus on this particular channel for two reasons. First, when firms buy shares of other companies during a
merger and acquisition process, they are typically paying the shareholders of other companies. More importantly,
using cash to finance the acquisition of another company can be considered as a form of investment in the physical,
human and intangible capital of the acquired company.
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2.2 Data description
I try to explain three figures representing the cash diverted by the firm to the ordinary
shareholders: dividends, share repurchases and ”Distributed Cash” defined as the
sum of both dividends and share buybacks. The ”Distributed Cash” is a measure
of the overall cash diverted to common shareholders. The cost to the company is
different and depends on the tax treatment of dividends and share buybacks. Several
firm’s characteristics and financial indicators are used to explain the flow of funds
towards ordinary shareholders. Three stand out as reflecting the firm’s appetite for
growth. These are TFP, investment expenses and the market to book ratio. High
investment expenses are a direct indication that the firm is in a growth mode while
a high market to book ratio can reflect a view by market participants that the firm
has a high growth potential. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is used as a proxy for
the firm’s efficiency of production and is typically high for growth firms.3 TFP is





where g is value added by the firm, the firm-level capital stock k is given by gross
plant, property and equipment (PPEGT) and the stock of labour l is given by the
number of employees. To remove industry specific TFP effects, the firm level log
TFP is corrected by removing 2 digits yearly industry averages. Investment expenses
include investment in capital (CAPEX) and research and development (R&D). The
market to book ratio is defined as the market value of ordinary equity divided by the
previous period’s assets’ value.4
I control for several firm level characteristics and cash-flow figures. These include
size related controls, namely, the firm’s asset value and market capitalisation. I also
control for net income as an indicator of the firm’s profitability. High levels of cash
and cash equivalent assets may indicate the presence of idle financial resources, which
may motivate the firm to reward shareholders. I therefore include a measure of cash
and cash equivalent assets to the set of control variables. The number of employees is
also included as it serves as a size indicator. Furthermore, the change in the number
of employees over time can indicate the firm’s wiliness to hire.
3See Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014).
4Another definition of the market to book ratio is the market value of the firm divided by its book value.
Adopting this definition restricts the size of the sample significantly as the book value data is only available for
a small protion of firms.
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I use Compustat US data to get or derive all the firm level variables of interest.5
Following existing corporate finance literature, utilities and financial industry firms
are removed from the sample as these companies are subject to specific regulations
that impact dividends’ distribution. To avoid outliers, firms with no assets are also
excluded. Share repurchases are defined, following Fama and French (2001), as the
increase in Treasury stock if the Treasury stock is not missing. Following Almeida,
Fos, and Kronlund (2016), if the Treasury stock is missing in the current or prior
year, share repurchases are measured as the difference between stock purchases and
stock issuances using the cash flow statements. If either measures is negative, share
repurchases are set to zero for the corresponding period. This data treatment is
maintained for the rest of this section.
Many of the studied firm characteristics and financial data vary in magnitude
for a single firm throughout the firm’s life cycle and between firms of various sizes
for a given year. Without any scaling, big firms would influence the regressions’
results more than small firms and later periods of the sample would influence the
results more than earlier periods due to the combined effects of inflation and capital
accumulation. To correct for these effects, I scale all of the variables, except for the
market to book ratio that does not require scaling and the assets’ value that I keep as
an unscaled measure of the size of the firm. Debt, cash holdings, net income, CAPEX,
R&D investments, the number of employees and TFP are divided by the value of
the previous period’s assets.6 The market capitalisation, is replaced by its percentile
equivalent.7 Dividends, share buybacks and the distributed cash are divided by the
previous market capitalisation. All variables, except for the market capitalisation
percentile, are Winsorised at the 1% level to correct for the outliers’ effect. Appendix
B.1 provides more details about the definition of the derived variables as well as a
summary of the transformation applied to the data.
2.3 Growth indicators and firms’ payouts
Table 1 presents averages of the distributed cash to market capitalisation ratios for
observations’ subgroups sorted using the growth indicators described in subsection
5The cost of labour data is obtained by multiplying the Compustat number of employees by the average
wages from the Social Security Administration. As explained in appendix B.1, the cost of labour is useful in the
derivation of the firm’s value added figure.
6These scaling choices are, to a large extent, inspired by Fama and French (2001).
7By percentile form of a variable Xt, I mean the transformation Percentile
X
t (x) = 100 ×
number of observations satisfying Xt<x
number of observations at time t .
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2.2. For every fiscal year, I calculate the deciles of all growth indicators and divide
the firms every year into groups delimited by two consecutive deciles. I then calcu-
late the average cash returned to market capitalisation ratio for each of the defined
groups of observations over the period between 1980 and 2013. The results show
a tendency for the average payout ratios to be lower for higher deciles of Market
to Book, TFP, CAPEX and R&D spending. This relationship is strongest for the
Market to Book decile groups where the average cash returned to market capitali-
sation ratio monotonically decreases from lower to higher deciles. The average cash
distributed to market capitalisation in the 90%-100% market to book decile is 0.47%.
It is much higher in the 0%-10% decile at 40.9%. A similar pattern is observed when
considering TFP decile groups. The average cash distributed to market capitalisa-
tion ratio for 0%-10% TFP decile is 31.0% while it stands at 1.34% for the highest
TFP decile. The relationship between TFP and the distributed cash to market cap-
italisation ratio is mostly decreasing, with the monotony being broken only for the
50%-60% and 60%-70% deciles. The lowest decile in terms of CAPEX spending
has an average distributed cash to market capitalisation ratio of 4.15% while the
highest decile has an average payout ratio of 1.48%. While there is no clear decreas-
ing behaviour of the distributed cash to market capitalisation ratio with relation to
CAPEX deciles, the average payout to market capitalisation ratio is smallest for the
90%-100% decile. R&D spending implied deciles display similar behaviour to the
CAPEX implied deciles, with the average distributed cash to market capitalisation
being lowest for the 90%-100% decile at 0.26%.
Given that the market capitalisation appears in the nominator of the definition of
the market to book ratio and in the denominator of the distributed cash to market
capitalisation ratio, the results for the market to book deciles may appear harder
to interpret. However, TFP decile groups display similar behaviour to the market
to book deciles’ groups while market capitalisation plays no role in the definition of
TFP.
2.4 Firm’s propensity to pay: evidence from repeated cross-
sectional logit regressions
In order to explain the decision of the firm’s management to pay back investors, I
run a series of cross-section logit regressions repeated for every fiscal year between
1980 and 2013, where the dependent variable is the ”Distributed Cash” and the
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Percentile Distributed Cash / Market Cap. - Average
% Mkt to Book Decile TFP Decile CAPEX Decile R&D Decile
0-10 0.4090 0.3198 0.0415 0.0253
10-20 0.0336 0.1160 0.0577 0.0721
20-30 0.0309 0.0484 0.0355 0.0512
30-40 0.0287 0.0306 0.0476 0.2224
40-50 0.0256 0.0258 0.0782 0.0497
50-60 0.0231 0.0583 0.0761 0.0256
60-70 0.0194 0.0311 0.0686 0.0718
70-80 0.0158 0.0189 0.0727 0.0140
80-90 0.0110 0.0148 0.1108 0.0084
90-100 0.0047 0.0134 0.0148 0.0026
Table 1: Average cash distributed to market capitalisation ratio by growth indicator decile buckets.
Growth Indicator decile cut-off points are recomputed for every year of the sample period. The growth
indicators are defined, scaled and transformed as described in section 2.2. Data from 1980 to 2013.
explanatory variables of interest are lagged indicators for the firm’s appetite to grow:
TFP, market to book ratio and the investment expenses (CAPEX and R&D). To
avoid competing effects between these growth indicators, separate regressions are
run to get the respective marginal effect of TFP, market to book ratio and the
combined effects of CAPEX and R&D expenditures. In addition, I run regressions
including all the growth indicators to assess their combined effects. The market
capitalisation percentile, assets, cash and cash equivalents, net income, debt and
number of employees are used as lagged controls in all the regressions. Two-digit
industry dummies are also included in the regressions to account for industry-related
effects. The repeated logit regressions can be described by the equation
yt = βx,txt−1 + βz,tzt−1 + industry dummies, (2.2)
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where yt is the ”distributed cash” variable, xt−1 denotes the lagged growth indicator









[TFP, Market/Book, CAPEX, R&D],
zt−1 = [Market Capitalisation, Assets, Cash, Net Income, Debt, Employees].
Figure 2 reports the estimated coefficients βx,t of the growth indicators and the
corresponding 95% confidence intervals for the logit regression 2.2, repeated for every
year from 1980 to 2013. Figures 14 and 15 provide the same coefficients and confi-
dence intervals over the same time period when the regression 2.2 is used to explain
dividends and share buybacks, respectively.
Firms with high growth indicators are less likely to divert cash towards investors,
the effects being both economically and statistically significant.8 Firms with higher
market/book, CAPEX and R&D investments have a lower propensity to reward
shareholders. This is consistent with Fama and French (2001) who find that firms
with high investment opportunities as reflected by high asset growth rates and high
market to book ratios are less likely to pay dividends. The results presented here
confirm these findings when including share buybacks in the measure of cash di-
verted towards equity holders. Although TFP has a statistically weaker marginal
effect when compared to other growth indicators, its effect remains both statistically
and economically significant for most of the studied period.9 Lower TFP leads to
higher propensity to divert cash towards shareholders, thus providing an empirical
justification to the model in section 3.
When simultaneously including all the growth indicators in the regressions, the
effects of the market to book ratio and R&D dominate the effects of other growth
8See appendix B.2 for means and standard deviations of the growth indicators.
9TFP underperforms the market to book ratio, possibly because TFP is measured with some noise. For
example, the formula 2.1 defining TFP assumes the same exponents for labour and capital for all firms over the
full sample period.
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indicators (figure 3). The marginal effects of CAPEX and TFP remain negative for
most of the studied period but lose their statistical significance in most years. This
is consistent with Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014) who find that firms with low TFP
have significantly higher equity returns in the following year but that the TFP effect
is not significant when other predictors, such as the market to book ratio, are used
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Figure 2: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries corresponding
to the effects of TFP, Market/Book and investment variables (CAPEX and R&D) on the firm’s propensity to
pay shareholders. The logit regressions are repeated for every year from 1980 to 2013. The TFP marginal
effect is estimated without controlling for Market/Book, CAPEX and R&D, The Market/Book marginal effect
is estimated without controlling for TFP, CAPEX and R&D and the CAPEX and R&D effects are estimated
in the same repeated regressions that exclude both TFP and Market/Book. Controls common to all regressions
include market capitalisation, assets, cash, net income, debt and the number of employees. Grey areas indicate
NBER recession periods.
The separate marginal effects of the growth indicators on dividends and share
buybacks are shown in appendix B.3 (figures 14 and 15). The results indicate that
firms with lower TFP are more likely to pay dividends and are more likely to buy
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Figure 3: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries corresponding to
the effects of TFP, Market/Book and investment variables (CAPEX and R&D) on the firm’s propensity to pay
shareholders. The logit regressions are repeated for every year from 1980 to 2013. The regressions include all
the growth indicators simultaneously. Controls common to all regressions include market capitalisation, assets,
cash, net income, debt and the number of employees. Grey areas indicate NBER recession periods.
payments than in the case of shares buybacks. Furthermore, the market to book ratio
and R&D spending effects are maintained when considering the propensity to pay
dividends and repurchase shares separately. Firms with lower market to book ratio
are more inclined to pay dividend and buy their shares back and the same applies
for firms with low R&D spending. The magnitude of both the market to book effect
and the R&D effects is stronger when explaining the propensity to pay dividends.
The marginal effects of the used controls are presented in appendix B.3. The
results confirm the literature findings regarding the relationship between some of the
firm’s characteristics and the propensity to pay shareholders. Large firms, meaning
those with large assets and high market capitalisation tend to distribute more cash
towards equity holders. Furthermore, as one may expect, firms that are burdened by
relatively high debt levels are less likely to pay equity investors, the debt effect being
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significant for almost every year of the studied time period. Lastly, the evidence from
the logit regressions shows no significant impact of cash holdings on the propensity
to pay. This is not an intuitive result. It is legitimate to suspect that high levels
of cash holdings may indicate a low investment opportunity and therefore incite the
firm to pay equity holders. I propose two possible justifications for the non intuitive
cash effect. First, the static nature of the regressions does not allow for taking into
account the firm’s idiosyncratic need of holding cash. For example, firms may keep
hold of relatively high cash amounts because of a lack of access to capital markets,
thus a high cash holding relative to assets might reflect that the firm is still in an
early development stage and has not reached the size where it can rely on capital
markets to help manage its cash flows. Firms that are still in the early stages of
their development are less likely to reward shareholders through cash distributions.
This might counteract the possible positive effect of cash holdings on shareholders
rewards.10 Moreover, the absence of dynamic effects of cash holdings makes it harder
to interpret the results. To correct for these issues, I run several dynamic fixed effects
regressions explaining the size of the cash diverted towards shareholders.
2.5 Size of payout: evidence from dynamic fixed effects re-
gressions
After considering the propensity of firms to divert any cash at all towards share-
holders, I now turn to the size of the payout, expressed as a fraction of the previous
period’s market capitalisation. To capture the strong persistence of cash distributions
and to control for non time varying firm level characteristics, I exclude observations
where no cash has been returned and run a two-way fixed effect dynamic panel data
regression to explain the size of the cash returned to ordinary equity holders during
the period between 1980 and 2013. Similarly to the static regressions case, each of
the main growth indicators are included in a separate regression to assess its effect in
absence of other indicators. I also present the results of a regression including all the
growth indicators to show which ones maintain a significant effect in the presence
of the others. The size of the overall cash distributed to shareholders is a strongly
persistent process. This requires the inclusion of multiple lagged dependent variables
in the regressions. To deal with the issue of estimating the coefficients of the lagged
10The negative correlation between the cash to asset ratio and the value of the firm’s assets appears to give
some credit to this explanation (table 7 of appendix B.2).
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dependent variables, I exclude firms with less than 15 observations within the sam-
ple period, this guarantees that the average number of time observations per firm
is higher than 20 in all regressions.11 The latter condition restricts the size of the
sample substantially. To increase the sample size, I exclude the sparsely populated




βiyt−i + βxxt−1 + βzzt−1 + fixed effects + time dummies, (2.3)
where yt is the distributed cash expressed as a fraction of the previous period’s market










and zt−1 are the same controls as in the logit regressions presented in subsection 2.4.
The results in table 2 confirm the strong persistence of the size of the payout.
Furthermore, all growth indicators have economically and statistically significant
effects when other growth indicators are excluded. The Akaike information criteria
show that the market to book ratio outperforms TFP and CAPEX as a growth
indicator. This is confirmed by the results of the model that uses all growth indicators
as explanatory variables (Full Model). In this model, the market to book ratio is the
only growth indicator with a statistically significant coefficient at the 0.001 confidence
level. The dynamic regressions’ results confirm that large firms by assets’ value tend
to pay more relative to their market capitalisation with the estimated coefficient being
statistically and economically significant and stable in value in all regressions. In the
presence of the market to book ratio in the regression, the latter result is extended to
11See Nickell (1981) and Bruno (2005) for more on the issue of estimating dynamic panel data regressions with
a large number of units and a small number of observations per unit.
12Excluding R&D expenses for the repeated logit regressions does not affect the estimation results in a way
that undermines the conclusion made in subsection 2.4.
20
large firms by market capitalisation. In the absence of the book to market ratio as an
explanatory variable, net income has a negative and statistically significant effect on
the distributed cash. This effect changes sign and becomes statistically insignificant
in the presence of the market to book ratio. As predicted above, when controlling
for the firm’s idiosyncratic effects and taking dynamic aspects into account, firms
with relatively high cash holdings tend to pay shareholders more. This is consistent
with the agency theory presented by Jensen (1986), stipulating that firms holding
large sums of idle cash have an incentive to distribute more through dividends and
share buybacks to reassure shareholders on the potential conflict of interest where
corporate managers keep large cash amounts on the firm’s balance sheet as a way
to increase resources under their control. Finally, the size of the distributed cash
decreases with the number of employees. This indicates that when controlling for
the firm’s fixed effects, changes in the number of employees represent a proxy for
investment in the labour force.
Full Model TFP Effect Market/Book Effect Investment Effect
L.Dist. Cash 0.166∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗
L2.Dist. Cash 0.0439∗∗∗ 0.0489∗∗∗ 0.0448∗∗∗ 0.0475∗∗∗




L.Market Cap. percentile 0.000176∗∗ 0.00000163 0.000187∗∗ 0.0000364
L.Assets 0.000000385∗∗∗ 0.000000493∗∗∗ 0.000000387∗∗∗ 0.000000453∗∗∗
L.Cash 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.0268∗∗∗ 0.0314∗∗∗ 0.0256∗∗∗
L.Net Income 0.0113 -0.0144∗ 0.00814 -0.0125∗
L.Debt -0.0182∗∗∗ -0.0191∗∗∗ -0.0192∗∗∗ -0.0176∗∗∗
L.Employees -0.238∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗
Constant 0.0262∗∗∗ 0.0317∗∗∗ 0.0249∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗
AIC -100793.7 -100567.1 -100786.5 -100585.9
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2: Two-way fixed effects dynamic model for the size of the cash distributed.
The dynamic fixed effect regression results for the size of dividends and share
buybacks are presented in the appendix.13 The results show that both dividends and
share buybacks sizes are persistent processes with dividends’ size showing stronger
persistence. When explaining the size of dividends and share buybacks separately
from each other, TFP fails to have a statistically significant effect even when other
13See tables 11 and 12 of the appendix.
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growth indicators are excluded from the regression. This provides extra motivation to
consider the combined ”distributed cash” variable. Firms investing in capital expen-
diture tend to execute smaller share buybacks operation, while CAPEX investments
do not appear to affect the size of dividends. Large firms by market capitalisation or
assets tend to pay large dividends relative to their market capitalisation with assets’
size having little impact on the size of dividends. On the other hand, large firms by
assets are more likely to complete larger share buyback operations with little effect
attributed to the market capitalisation percentile. Higher net income increases the
size of dividends while not impacting the size of share buybacks operations. The
results also suggest that firms use share buybacks more than dividends to manage
relatively high cash balances. Finally, hiring reduces the size of both dividends and
share buybacks relative to market capitalisation.
2.6 Summary of the empirical results
After considering empirical evidence linking the firm’s appetite to grow to its propen-
sity to pay shareholders and the size of the payouts, it appears that firms with an
ability and appetite for growth divert less cash towards shareholders. I measure the
appetite/ability to grow using the market to book ratio, investment expenses and
TFP. While the market to book ratio performs better than other growth indicators in
explaining distributions to shareholders, the TFP’s marginal effect on the propensity
to pay and size of the payouts is significant both in economic and statistic terms in
the absence of other growth indicators.14 As predicted by the theory, firms holding
large sums of cash are more likely to divert cash towards shareholders. This rela-
tionship fails to appear in the repeated static logit regressions that do not control
for the changes in cash levels and for the firm idiosyncratic effects but is shown in
the fixed effect dynamic regression explaining the size of shareholders payout.
The model developed in section 3 assumes that profit maximising firms can choose
to distribute some of the cash at their disposal to shareholders instead of spending to
produce, following unpredicted drops in productivity. The evidence presented above
can serve as an empirical justification to the mechanism linking TFP to spending.
14The market to book ratio is derived using the share price. It is reasonable to assume that market participants
take into account information regarding the firm’s productivity and investment expenses when setting their beliefs
about the share price. Additionally, TFP is a noisy measure of the firm’s production efficiency. It is therefore




signal ε and decides
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t+1 + ε+ ε
′
t+ 1
Constrained Case: high ui,t+1
Fim uses all financing fi,t to fund
expenditure ζi,t+1 = fi,t/(1 + πt+1)
t+ 1
Unconstrained Case: low ui,t+1
Firm gives back some cash to shareholders
ζi,t+1 < fi,t/(1 + πt+1)
Figure 4: Timeline of the firm financing-spending process.
3 The model
In this section, I build a general equilibrium model that illustrates the underspend-
ing mechanism described in the introduction. In order to study the incentive of the
firm to underspend, I separate the firm’s financing problem from its spending prob-
lem. The firm first sets its financing based on its assessment of productivity at the
financing stage. Production spending is decided some time after the financing stage
and the previously set financing acts as an upper limit for potential spending. Fol-
lowing some unpredicted deterioration in productivity between the financing stage
and spending stage, the firm can set spending at a lower level than the financing
constraint.
In the set-up I consider, households maximize their utility to decide consumption
and leisure subject to a budget constraint. The single consumption good is produced
by firms that are constrained by a Cobb-Douglas production function. Financial
intermediaries finance production through loan issuance and in the absence of credit
risk, all firms face the same interest rate: rFt . The diagram in figure 4 explains
the firm’s financing/spending decision process: the firm i decides its real financing
fi,t at time t knowing its first productivity signal ε and raises the required amount




just before producing at
time t + 1, where uat+1 denotes an aggregate log-productivity process and ε
′ a final
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idiosyncratic shock the firm’s log-productivity. At time t+ 1, the profit-maximizing
firm assesses its own productivity and the prevailing wages and prices, then chooses
whether to spend all the raised financing fi,t/(1 + πt+1) (constrained spending case)
or to spend less than the raised financing level ζi,t+1 < fi,t/(1 + πt+1) (unconstrained
spending case). Note here that the real financing is impacted by the level of inflation
πt+1 between the financing stage and the time of production.
The firm financing is provided by banks that are themselves financed through
household’s deposits and money injections from the monetary authority. The com-
mercial bank is supposed to operate with zero profit so that the monetary injections
are passed to the borrowing firms in the form of higher available loan principals at
lower interest rates charged.
The model builds on the working capital model in Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992) while introducing the financing/spending time friction explained above, het-
erogeneity in the firms’ productivities and some changes to the way demand for
money is introduced. The remainder of this section details the behaviours of house-
holds, firms, commercial banks and the monetary authority before commenting on
the level of productivity drop required for firms to enter an underspending mode.
I then provide several analytical results regarding the distribution of financing and
the aggregation of financing, spending and production. These results simplify the
calibration and simulation of the model.
3.1 Households
Households derive utility from leisure and consumption. Their utility function takes
the form










where lt denotes the household’s labour, ct consumption, M
H
t the households’ money
holdings, Pt the price of the consumption good, ψ is a paramter that help control the
level of real money holdings by households, ν is the curvature on the utility form hold-
ing real cash balances, η the curvature on dislike of labour and χ is a parameter that
controls for households’ dislike of labour. The direct demand by households for real
money balances can be justified by a role played by money to simplify transactions.15
Consumers maximise their expected lifetime utility discounted at rate β under their
15See Croushore (1993) on the equivalence between money in the utility function and a shopping-time model.
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budget constraint in order to set their consumption, their leisure time 1 − lt, their
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subject to the sequence budget constraint











where w is the real wage, r the gross nominal interest rate on deposits and rK the
real net rate of return on capital. The terms ΠF and ΠB represent the real profits
distributed respectively by the firms and the banks, both owned by households.
Equity investors (i.e., households) are assumed to cover the debt payment shortfall
in the case where the firm’s proceeds do not cover its debt obligations. This means
that the real profit ΠF provided by the firm to households can be negative and helps
avoid firms’ bankruptcies.
Solving the household’s optimisation problem, the nominal interest rate rt and
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where i denotes the firm, ki,t the capital and li,t the labour it uses, α is the share of
capital, γ a return to scale parameter and eui,t a firm specific stochastic productivity
process. Within the studied framework, increasing returns to scale would imply
infinite financing demand and constant return to scale would lead to undetermined
levels of firm financing. Empirically, many studies could not reject the constant
return to scale hypothesis on the industry level while others point towards a slightly
decreasing returns to scale.16 Decreasing returns to scale are therefore used as a
source of curvature in the profit function that guarantees a unique solution to the
financing problem (γ < 1).17






t + εi,t−1 + ε
′
i,t, (3.9)
where εi,t−1 and ε
′









dFε′ = 1. The variable ε and ε
′ are assumed to
be independent of each other and of the aggregate log-productivity uat . The shock
εi,t−1 is known to the firm at time t− 1 and the shock ε′i,t is not resolved before the
production time t. The shock εi,t−1 can be interpreted as a signal available to the






dFε′ = 1 and the independence of ε, ε




In other words, the expected TFP of the firm at time t, conditional on the information
available at time t− 1 is a function of εi,t−1 and the expected aggregate productivity
at time t. As long as one keeps in mind the times the static variables ε and ε′ are
16Syverson (2004), Olley and Pakes (1996) and others could not statistically reject the constant return to scale
hypothesis. Other studies find slight to moderate decreasing return to scale, for example, Gao and Kehrig (2017).
17This is consistent with the literature concerned with heterogeneous firms as for or example in Restuccia and
Rogerson (2008) and Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2013).
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determined, one can simply write
ui,t = u
a
t + ε+ ε
′. (3.11)
The aggregate log-productivity uat is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with the




The firm finances production using loan contracts that are issued by financial
intermediaries. In the absence of default risk, which I assume, all firms face the
same rate rFt . At time t, each firm decides the nominal financing amount Ptfi,t that
will potentially be invested in the next period’s production process (fi,t denotes real











and the the real unspent financing
fi,t
1+πt+1
− wt+1li,t+1 − rKt+1kt







− wt+1li,t+1 − rKt+1kt
}
(3.13)




− wt+1li,t+1 − rKt+1kt
}
is nil when the firm is
constrained at the spending stage and positive otherwise. Note that no discounting
of the profit is needed because all the cash-flows of the firm happen at time t+ 1. As
long as the discounting rate is known at time t, which I assume, discounting plays
no role in the firm’s financing problem.18 It is also useful to note that real financing
fi,t is determined by the aggregate shock at time t and the type ε, one can therefore
adopt the notation fi,t = fε,t.
At period t + 1, the representative firm chooses labour li,t+1 and rented capital
ki,t+1 to maximise profit with spending being constrained by the previously set level of
financing fi,t/(1 + πt+1) corrected for inflation. The terms fi,t and rtfi,t in the profit
function expression 3.13 are predetermined at time t, so the profit maximisation





yi,t+1 − wt+1li,t+1 − rKt+1ki,t+1, (3.14)






Increasing returns to scale being excluded (γ < 1), it is a priori not obvious whether
the constraint 3.15 holds or not. Let us define ζi,t+1 as the cost of production t+ 1
ζi,t+1 := wt+1li,t+1 + r
K
t+1ki,t+1. (3.16)
From the first order conditions of the spending problem 3.14
rKt+1ki,t+1 = αζi,t+1 (3.17)
wt+1li,t+1 = (1− α)ζi,t+1 (3.18)
Exploiting the first order conditions above, one can rewrite production as a function













The firm’s financing problem simplifies to the problem below, where the firm has to











If the financing constraint is not binding (ζi,t+1 <
fi,t
1+πt+1
), the firm sets labour such
19This formulation of production justifies the decreasing returns to scale assumption. The firm profit function
at time t+ 1 is eui,t+1
ζγi,t+1
(λt+1)γ
− ζi,t+1. Clearly, if γ = 1 spending can be undetermined and if γ > 1, firms would
prefer to spend an infinite amount and the financing demand would be infinite as a result.
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ζi,t+1 = γyi,t+1. (3.24)
In other words, when unconstrained by financing, firms set their expenditure at a
level where they are indifferent between producing and simply distributing cash to








The latter condition stipulates that, for unconstrained firms, the marginal return on
spending at the constraint is less than the marginal return of distributing cash to
shareholders. This underspending characterisation can be rewritten as follows
ε′ ≤ ξt+1(ε), (3.26)
where the cutting point ξt+1(ε) depends (a priori) on the signal ε received by the firm
at the time of financing and is defined as








Everything else being equal, underspending is more (less) likely when ε, ε′ and uat+1 are
lower (higher), the previously set real financing fi,t is higher (lower), the real marginal
cost of production λt+1 are higher (lower) and inflation πt+1 is lower (higher). The


























Note how inflation plays a direct role in setting production spending and production
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only if the firm is constrained by previous financing.20
3.3 Financial intermediation and monetary policy
Following Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), a direct monetary channel is oper-
ated by injecting money in financial intermediary to help finance the loans extended
to production firms. The representative bank provides the firms with the loan fi,t
charging the gross nominal rate rFt . The bank finances its loans operations using
households deposits bt and a monetary injection from the central bank that is pro-
portional to the existing nominal stock of money









fi,tdFεdFε′ is the aggregate real bank lending, mt−1/(1 + πt) is the
existing total real stock of money inherited from the previous time period and xBt is
the relative change in the stock of money. The bank profit function is then
ΠBt+1 = r
F









+ (rFt − rt)bt. (3.32)
The monetary authority provides the financial intermediaries with the new money
in the goal of easing credit conditions for firms. This prevents the increase in the
money supply from being distributed equally to all agents and guarantees a role for
money in the model’s fluctuations. Following Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), I
assume that the bank’s profit is zero (ΠBt+1 = 0). This yields
rFt ft = rtbt. (3.33)
I assume that the money growth xBt follows the AR(1) process
xBt = (1− ρm)xB + ρmxBt−1 + σmvt, (3.34)
20Inflation plays an indirect role in setting the production spending and the production of unconstrained firms
through its influence on the cost of producing λt+1.
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where xB is the steady state value of xBt , σm is the volatility of innovations, ρm is
the autocorrelation parameter and vt is an i.i.d error term that is independent of all
other shocks in the model.
The assumption that money is directly injected in the financial intermediaries
can be justified by the ability of central banks to affect lending through the use
of open-market operations (Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)). All the stock of
money available at the end of the production cycle is inherited by the households




= mHt + bt. (3.35)
The latter money clearing condition, combined with the household demand for money
emanating from utility maximisation as described by equation 3.1, helps determine











It is important to note that unlike in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), the house-
hold decisions in terms of consumption, money holding and saving are not set before
the injection of new money by the monetary authority. While the new money is
not distributed equally to all agents, it still influences the decisions of households.
For instance, through increasing inflation, the monetary injection increases the nom-
inal rate rt and pushes households to save more through deposits at the expense of
holding money.
3.4 Equilibrium and market clearing
The equilibrium is realised when prices (wt, r
H
t , rt) and the quantities ct, bt, lt, fi,t, ζi,t,
li,t and ki,t are such that firms maximise expected profit at the financing stage subject
to the technology constraint and maximise profit at the spending stage subject to
the technology and financing constraints, households maximise utility subject to their
budget constraint and the various markets within the economy clear. These markets
are:
• The good’s market where all the production is either consumed by households
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yi,tdFεdFε′ = ct + kt − (1− δ)kt−1. (3.37)






• The market for real capital, where the capital accumulated by households is




















In this subsection, I provide several theoretical results that help in solving and simu-
lating the underspending model. These results do not depend on the distributions of
ε and ε′, nor do they depend on the assumed monetary policy. I start by providing
a debt financing equation describing the firms’ demand for loans.
Proposition 1. The firms’ financing demand satisfies the following condition










Proof. The spending and production expressions 3.28 and 3.29 yield the derivatives
















Hence the first order condition emanating from problem financing problem 3.12 is
given by 3.41. 
Proposition 1 shows that, when underspending by firms is possible, money pro-
vides a floor for the marginal return on nominal debt financing Ptfi,t (the floor being
1). This extra protection afforded to firms while they keep hold of cash pushes them
to increase their demand for new financing. Exploiting the independence of the final
idiosyncratic productivity shock ε′ of the signal ε and of the aggregate productivity
shock uat+1, I can rewrite the financing condition 3.41 as the per the corollary below.
Corollary 1. The firms’ financing demand satisfies the following condition
rFt = Et
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where ξt+1 is the cutting point for ε
′ below which firm i underspends and is defined
as above








Equation 3.44 cannot be solved individually for each firm. Rather, the full distri-
bution of firms’ debt financing is jointly determined such as 3.44 holds for all values
of ε in the support of the distribution Fε. This is because the distribution of financing
decided today, influences the distributions of inflation πt+1 and production costs λt+1
in the following time period. Proposition 2 provides the firms’ financing distribution
(fε,t) given the level of aggregate debt financing ft :=
∫
ε
fε,tdFε. This simplifies the
model substantially and helps in providing single equations determining aggregate
financing, aggregate spending and aggregate production. Proposition 2 assumes that
the net financing rates facing the firm are positive. This guarantees a finite demand
for financing by individual firms. Unlike in the liquidity trap models, zero interest
rates are not important for the functioning of the underspending mechanism.
Proposition 2. Assume that the firms are facing a positive net financing rate rFt >
1. Then the following results stand
i The critical value of ε′ below which the firm enters an underspending mode is
independent of the signal ε received at the financing time and is given by

















is a normalisation constant that is determined by the distribution Fε.
ii The distribution of the firms’ debt financing is given by
fi,t = Afte
ε/(1−γ), (3.46)
where A and ft are as defined above.
iii The aggregate debt financing satisfies
rFt = Et
[









where ξt+1 as defined in 3.45.
Proof. First write the firm dependent critical value of ε′ below which the firm under-
spends in the form

























does not depend of on the signal ε and ξt,ε is function of ε and the
state of the economy at time t. From equation 3.44, the variable ξt,ε is solution to
the equation
rFt = Ht(ξt,ε), (3.49)

















is a function of ξt,ε
that is independent of the signal ε with a derivative verifying: dH
dX




−∞ and limX→+∞H (X) = 1 < rFt .21 The equation 3.49 has therefore a unique so-











lution that is independent of the signal ε:
ξt,ε = ξt. (3.50)
The definition of ξt,ε then yields the distribution of debt financing
fi,t = Afte
(ε+ξt)/(1−γ). (3.51)
Combining the equation above, the definition of the aggregate loan financing ft :=∫
ε





implies that ξt =
0. Hence the first result of the proposition and the distribution of debt financing
described by the equation 3.46. Combining 3.46 and 3.49 with ξ
t+1
= ξt+1 yields the
financing equation 3.47. 
I now turn to the aggregate spending ζt+1 :=
∫
i
ζi,t+1dF (i) that I write using the


















The first term in the right-hand side of the equation above represents spending by
unconstrained firms while the second term reflects spending by constrained firms.
Similarly, I write the aggregate production yt :=
∫
yi,tdFεdFε′ using the expression
























Exploiting the independence of ε′ of ε, one can rewrite the aggregate spending
and aggregate production as a function of the previously set debt financing and the
variable ξ.




(real) output yt+1 :=
∫
ε


















































Proof. This proposition is derived from expressions 3.52 and 3.53 and the results of










to replace for the term γe
uat+1
λγt+1
. The latter identity is derived from the definition of
ξt+1. 
Note that in the absence of underspending (ξt+1 << 0), the aggregate financing
is equal to the previously set debt financing ζt+1 = ft/(1 + πt+1) and the aggregate
output is determined by the previously set aggregate debt financing, the new aggre-








. It is also useful to note
that the formulae of proposition 3 immediately yield the aggregate underspending
as a proportion of the aggregate debt financing



























The loss in production as a result of underspending, should not be interpreted as a
welfare loss. The next section will show that, in the steady state, higher underspend-
ing can correspond to a higher utility for households.
4 Model simulations and results
In this section, I present and comment the model’s simulations and steady results
and explain the calibration process. Exploiting the aggregation results of section
36
3, the model is calibrated in the steady state and simulated using second order
approximations in Dynare.
4.1 Steady state calibration
Before calibrating the model and studying its steady state behaviour, I need to specify
the assumed distributions of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks ε and ε′. These
shocks are assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution with a standard deviations σε










µε = −(σε)2/2, (4.1)
µε′ = −(σε′)2/2. (4.2)
The model equations implied by this specification of the distributions Fε and Fε′ are
presented in appendix A.1.
Following Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2013), I assume modest re-
turn to scale and set γ = 0.95. The volatility parameter of the productivity signal ε
is set to σε = 7.5% for the model steady state to match the standard deviation of log
employment in the United States at 1.2 as in Poschke (2018). The volatility of the






). I identify the underspending firms with those buying back
shares in section 2’s data. This parameter is set to σε′ = 0.92% to match a steady
state where 20% of firms buy shares back (figure 1). Furthermore, the parameter ψ
is chosen so that the steady state of money balances to deposits mH/m matches the
M1/M2 ratio for the United States at 25%. The remaining parameters are standard
and are borrowed from the literature (table 3).
The effects of the parameter σε on steady-state variables are shown in figure 5.
Around its calibrated value, the parameter σε has little effect on the underspending
mechanism and other aggregate variables in the steady state. This changes when
the value of σε is high enough as the steady-state capital and debt financing moves
exponentially with the volatility of the productivity signal ε.22 However, the impact
on underspending remains small even for large values of σε. On the other hand, the
level of underspending in the economy is sensitive to the volatility of the final id-






enters the expressions of steady-state output, spending and capital (see appendix A.2).
37
iosyncratic productivity shock σε′ while other steady-state variables are less sensitive
to changes in σε′ (figure 6). This justifies the calibration choice.
I then show in figure 7 the steady-state effects of the annualised net real deposit
rate (1/β)4 − 1 that is determined by the preference discounting parameter. When
steady-state real deposit rates are small underspending becomes more widespread
among firms. This is an important feature of the model and is related to the fact
that the underspending mechanism becomes more potent when the loan interest rates
are low. When real deposit rates drop lower while the steady-state inflation remains
constant, the financing rates facing firms also drops lower. Faced with lower loan
rates, firms target lower returns on financing as they set the level of loans so that, in
expectation, the net return from production matches the net financing cost. When
the targeted returns are lower, smaller productivity drops cause the marginal return
on producing, using all available funds, to be lower than one (i.e., lower than the
marginal return on cash). This increases the underspending critical point ξ below
which the final idiosyncratic shock ε′ pushes the firms to underspend, causing more
aggregate underspending in the steady state. The increase in underspending when
β is high is accompanied by a sharp increase in steady-state loan financing and a
less sharp increase in capital and output. The sharp increase in loan financing is a
consequence of the higher demand for financing by firms in response to lower financing
costs. This demand is exacerbated by the underspending mechanism as firms view
the possibility to underspend as protection from lower returns on financing in case
of unexpected negative shocks to productivity. The increase in steady-state capital
is chiefly caused by the inclination of the more patient household to save through
capital accumulation. Higher capital when β is high causes a more moderate increase
in output as steady-state labour remains fairly stable.
Figure 8 shows the effect of the steady state inflation π = xB on the model’s
steady state variables. Within the assumed monetary policy framework, the injection
of money is used by financial intermediaries to reduce the loan rate relative to the
deposit rates. As explained above, lower financing rates lead to the firm targeting
lower returns on the borrowing at the financing stage. This increases underspending
in the steady state as lower drops in productivity makes the firms unconstrained by
the previous financing. The ”liquidity effect” associated with the monetary injections
increases debt financing in the steady state and by extension increases capital, labour,
output and consumption. Finally, the welfare implications of liquidity injections are
shown in figure 9, where I present the effect of the level of money injection xB on
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the households’ utility including and excluding the utility derived from holding real
money balances. In the assumed monetary set-up, inflation has a positive impact
on welfare as it helps increase the proportion of firms that are unconstrained by
financing in the steady state.
4.2 Simulation Results
I present impulse response functions illustrating the dynamic effects of the model’s
main mechanism. Figure 10 compares impulse responses of the model with the firm’s
underspending mechanism (main model) to a version of the model where the financ-
ing constraints are always binding (benchmark model). The figure shows the impulse
responses of the main model variables to an unpredicted negative shock to aggregate
productivity (1× standard deviations). In the benchmark model, the financing con-
straint is always biding. This means that nominal spending is decided in the previous
period. Following a surprise negative shock to aggregate productivity, It takes an
extra time period for firms to set spending lower. As a result, the trough of labour,
investment and output is not reached immediately after the shock. In the absence
of the underspending mechanism the nominal spending on wages is predetermined,
so the real spending on wages decreases only because of the higher inflation.23 The
increase in inflation is partially compensated by the decrease in real wages, leading
to a small drop in labour. The muted reaction of labour moderates the reaction of
output to the shock. This in turn mutes the reaction of real investment. Assuming
the calibration of the main model detailed above, 20% of the firms underspend in
the steady state. Following a negative shock to productivity, these firms can ad-
just their spending lower and others will follow suit as the aggregate negative shock
reduces their marginal return on spending to fund production (the proportion of
underspending firms jumps from 20% to 27%). This pushes real aggregate spending
lower immediately. Hence the more immediate reaction of labour, investment, output
and consumption in the main model.
As explained above, the model’s mechanism is more potent in low real rates,
low inflation environment. This is an environment where nominal loan rates are
low, which pushes firms to target a low return from its production operations as the
financing cost it needs to pay back is lower. Targeting a low return from production at
the financing time implies that smaller drops in productivity are enough to make firms
23Recall that wtlt = (1− α)ζt = (1− α)ft−1/(1 + πt) when spending is always constrained.
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prefer cash to spending on production. More firms underspend as a result. Following
an unexpected aggregate productivity drop, more firms would reduce spending in this
low nominal loan rate environment as shown in figure 11. This figure shows similar
effects to those shown in figure 10 but the magnitude of these effects is higher given
that the underspending mechanism is more potent with the new calibration. This
confirms the finding of subsection 4.1. The prevailing interest and inflation rates are
important in deciding both dynamic and in steady state effects of the underspending
mechanism.
I now turn to the monetary implication of the underspending mechanism. Figure
12 shows the impulse responses to an unexpected positive shock in money supply
of the main model, with underspending, and the benchmark model, where firms are
always constrained by the previous financing. Immediately after the money supply
shock, inflation increases in both models. The rise in inflation causes real wages to
drop when the underspending mechanism is absent. This depresses labour supply
and in turn brings output, investment and consumption down. When firms can un-
derspend (main model), the subgroup of unconstrained firms react to higher inflation
by spending more on wages and capital. This helps mute the effect of inflation on
real wages and moderates the fall in labour supply. The fall in output, investments
and consumptions is also moderated by the underspending mechanism as a result.
Furthermore, underspending affects the reaction of debt financing to the monetary
shock. The cash injection is used by financial intermediaries to increase credit supply
to firms while lowering the charged interest rates. The possibility of underspending
provides a floor to the future nominal return from financing. This floor is one, i.e.
the same as the nominal return from holding cash. This option to underspend at a
later stage encourages firms to borrow more in the presence of the underspending
mechanism. Hence a larger positive reaction of debt financing to the monetary shock
in the main model relative to the benchmark model. The positive debt financing
reaction increases the level of financing and therefore introduces more slack in the
firms’ future spending. Hence higher levels of aggregate underspending in the peri-
ods following the shock. In the absence of the model’s main mechanism, the increase
in firm financing leads to higher firm spending in the periods following the mone-
tary shock. In the main model, this increase is moderated by the more widespread
underspending that is caused by higher real financing.24 Overall, the presence of
24As suggested by the equation 3.45 for the critical level of ε′ below which firms underspend increases with the
previously set nominal aggregate debt financing.
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the underspending mechanism mutes the immediate consequences of inflations and
slightly moderates the impact of the monetary injection on future spending, labour,
output and investments.
In a calibration set-up that assumes more patient households (higher β), the
steady state loan rate is lower and more firms underspend in the steady state as a
result. This impacts the reaction of aggregate variables to monetary shocks in the
presence of the underspending mechanism. Impulse response to a surprise positive
monetary shock for β = 0.998 are shown in figure 13. In the presence of underspend-
ing, the larger proportion of firms that are unconstrained by financing in the steady
state fully counteract the effect of inflation on real wages by increasing their spend-
ing. This maintains labour supply at the same level immediately following the shock.
Therefore, output also remains stable, in the presence of underspending, at the time
of the monetary shock. In the main model, there is a sharp increase in debt financing
but most of this increase of financing is distributed to households in the form of cash
and not used to fund extra production. On the other hand, the behaviour of the
benchmark model without the underspending mechanism is similar to the one noted
when analysing the results for the standard calibration (figure 12). Assuming more
patient households (high β), the reaction of most of the main model’s variables to
the monetary shock is quite muted. This includes real wages, labour, output, invest-
ment, consumption and the loan rate. The exception being the more pronounced
reaction in terms of debt financing and the subsequent increase in underspending.
This can be explained by the fact that the option to underspend is worth more to
firms when loan rates are lower as this underspending option becomes more likely to
be acted upon at a later stage. Taking this into account firms raise more debt and
subsequently distribute more cash to shareholders.25 The analysis here suffers from
the fact that I assume no possibility of bankruptcy. This assumption makes firms less
concerned about future underspending. Arguably, a model with longer-lived firms
and precautionary cash hoarding motives would counteract the effect of defaults and
maintain demand for debt higher.
In summary, the underspending mechanism makes the effects of real shocks more
immediate and more severe and dampens the immediate effects of higher inflation.
This is a result of the set of unconstrained firms reacting to real negative (positive)
shocks by decreasing (increasing) spending. Following an unexpected negative shock
25In the language of quantitative finance and equity options, the underspending option is ”in the money”,
meaning it is likely to be worth something positive at its exercise time, which in our case, is the next time period.
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to productivity, firms do not have to wait an additional time period for the effect of
the newly set financing to impact spending. Some firms will reduce both spending
and financing immediately when a sudden negative real shock hits the economy, thus
causing a more immediate and more severe drop in output. Within the assumed
monetary framework, an increase in the stock of money relaxes lending conditions
and provides firms with more credit as a result. When spending is always constrained,
the increase in firm financing is accompanied by an increase in firm spending in the
following time-period, leading to higher labour and higher output. This effect is
dampened in the presence of the underspending mechanism as the behaviour of the
set of financially unconstrained firms is not impacted by the easing in credit supply.
Environments where underspending is more widespread (e.g. environments where the
loan rates are low) increase both the real and monetary effects of the underspending
mechanism.
5 Conclusion
I presented a financial mechanism rooted in the way firms change their behaviour
towards setting current expenditure as a reaction to unexpected negative shocks to
productivity. When affected by unexpected drops in their productivity, firms can
react by reducing spending to lower levels than those permitted by the financial
resources at their disposal. I showed that this underspending mechanism can make
the effects of real shocks more immediate and more severe while dampening the effects
of monetary shocks. I also showed that environments where firms face low nominal
loan rates, are favourable to the functioning of the underspending mechanism and
strengthen its effects. The results I present suggest that policymakers should take
firms’ underspending into account when forming a picture of the economy in the view
of informing policy.
To provide empirical validation of the model, I study the effect of productivity
on the propensity of firms to pay shareholders back and on the size of these payouts.
I show that higher firm-level productivity lowers both the likelihood and the levels
of the payouts. I assume that part of the cash diverted towards investors would
have been spent on improving or increasing production had the firm decided against
rewarding shareholders in the short term. The latter assumption and the negative
empirical relationship between productivity and investor payouts indicate that firms
decrease spending to respond to negative productivity shocks.
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The model I present has limitations. For instance, it assumes that the firm is
very short-lived and, as a result, does not consider the long term impact of the
firms’ decisions regarding investments in physical and human capital. Furthermore,
the model does not allow for firms bankruptcies, nor does it capture precautionary
saving motives in an explicit form. These issues have been ignored to keep the
analysis simple and the model analytically tractable. Tackling these limitations is




β discount factor 0.99
η curvature on labour 1
χ disutility of labour 7.4
ν curvature on real money 2
ψ real money demand 0.2%
Technology
γ return to scale 0.95
α capital share 0.33
ρa aggregate TFP persistence 0.8
σa aggregate TFP volatility 1%
δ depreciation rate of capital 2.5%
σε volatility of productivity signal 7.5%
σε′ volatility of final productivity shock 0.92%
Money Supply
xB steady state money supply 0.5%
ρm persistence of monetary shocks 80%
σm volatility of monetary shocks 0.25%
Table 3: Assumed and calibrated model parameters.
Figure 5: Effect of the volatility of the productivity signal perceived by the firm at the time of financing σε on
steady state variables. All rates are net and annualised.
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Figure 6: Effect of the volatility of the final idiosyncratic productivity shock σε′ on steady state variables. All
rates are net and annualised.
Figure 7: Effect of the steady state annualised net real deposit rate (1/β)4 − 1 on steady state variables. All
rates are net and annualised.
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Figure 8: Effect of the assumed steady state money injection (1 + xB)4 − 1 on steady state variables. All rates
are net and annualised.
Figure 9: Effect of the assumed steady state money injection (1 + xB)4 − 1 on steady state household’s utility
and steady state household’s utility excluding the utility derived from money.
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Figure 10: Impulse response functions following a negative 1× standard deviation shock to aggregate log TFP
(uat ). The main model is compared to a model where the financing constrain is always binding (Benchmark,
dashed line). All variables are expressed in real terms and logarithmic form with the exception of inflation, loan
rates and the % of underspending firms.
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Figure 11: Impulse response functions following a negative 1× standard deviation shock to aggregate log TFP
(uat ) assuming a high preferences discount factor β = 0.999 and low steady state inflation x
B = 0.01%. The main
model is compared to a model where the financing constrain is always binding (Benchmark, dashed line). All
variables are expressed in real terms and logarithmic form with the exception of inflation, loan rates and the %
of underspending firms.
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Figure 12: Impulse response functions following a positive 1× standard deviation shock to money supply (xBt ).
The main model is compared to a model where the financing constrain is always binding (Benchmark, dashed
line). All variables are expressed in real terms and logarithmic form with the exception of inflation, loan rates
and the % of underspending firms.
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Figure 13: Impulse response functions following a positive 1× standard deviation shock to money supply (xBt )
assuming a high preferences discount factor β = 0.998. The main model is compared to a model where the
financing constrain is always binding (Benchmark, dashed line). All variables are expressed in real terms and
logarithmic form with the exception of inflation, loan rates and the % of underspending firms.
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I write the model equations assuming the distribution of ε and ε′ in section 4.1.26
ct + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt = yt, (A.1)




























(1 + πt)bt +mt−1xBt
rt, (A.8)
ft = bt +mt−1x
B




































































































26To derive the model equations in the case of a Gaussian distribution for ε′, I use the following result: If X is






















A.2 Steady state equilibrium
The steady state (SS) variables are noted without the time subscript. The SS inflation is
given by
π = xB. (A.15)









− 1− δ. (A.17)
I will express the remaining SS variables as a function of the critical final productivity
shock below which the firm underspends ξ. Then, I will provide a way to solve for ξ so
that all SS variables are determined.
First note that the cost of financing facing the firms in the steady state can be expressed

















Now note that, from the aggregation equations for output and spending, the quantities
λ
γ
1−γ y and λ
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I combine the labour provision equation 3.6 with the good clearing identity (c + δk = y)
and the capital first order condition (rKk = αζ) to determine steady state labour as a












This, combined with the firm’s labour first order condition (w = (1 − α)ζ/l), determines

















































The later result yields the SS production cost λ, the SS output y, the SS wage w =
(1−α)ζ/l, the SS capital k = αζ/rK , the SS consumption c = y− δαζ/rK and the SS real
money (mH)ν = ψ rr−1c as a function of ξ and the model’s parameters. The aggregate debt











The SS individual financing firms debt levels are then expressed using 3.46 and the SS real
money is derived from the money demand condition A.10. The SS real saving is deduced





and the total stock of real money is m = (1 + xB)(mH + b).
After expressing all the SS variable of the model as a function of ξ and the model





For the model’s parameters I consider here, I verify numerically that the latter equation has
a unique solution. Once, the SS variable ξ is known, the remaining steady state variables
are determined in a straightforward manner.
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B Empirical appendix
B.1 Data and derived variables
These variables are reported directly by the data: assets’ value, cash and cash equivalent,
net income, CAPEX spending, R&D spending and the number of employees. Other vari-
ables are derived as follows.
Market Capitalisation = ”Common Shares Outstanding” × ”Price Close - Annual -
Calendar”;
Debt = ”Debt in Current Liabilities - Total” + ”Long-Term Debt - Total”;
Market to Book = ”Market Capitalisation” / ”Assets - Total”;
Value Added = ”Operating Income Before Depreciation” + ”Employees” x ”Average
Wage from the Social Security Administration”;
Share Buybacks = 1 year change in ”Treasury Stock - Common”, if the above is nega-
tive or missing use: ”Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock” minus ”Sale of Common
and Preferred Stock”. If both figures are negative or missing, Share Buybacks are set to
zero for the corresponding period.
Except for the assets value, all the variables are scaled either using the percentile form
of the variable or through division by the previous time period’s assets or the previous
market capitalisation. All the variables but those in percentile form are 1% Winsorised to
deal with outlier values. These data transformations are summarised in table 4.
B.2 Descriptive Statistics
I present the summary statistics of the indicators used to construct the regressions vari-
able in table 5, the summary statistics of the transformed variables are in table 6. The
correlation matrix of the variables as used in the regressions are in table 7.
B.3 More Empirical Results
Further empirical results are presented in this subsection. I present the logit regression
results for the marginal effects of each of the growth indicators while excluding other
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Divided by prev. assets Percentile Divided by prev. market cap. Winsorised (1%)
Assets X
Cash Dist. X X
Dividends X X
Share Buybacks X X
Productivity X X
Market to Book X
Market Cap. X
Cash X X





Table 4: Summary of transformation applied to the models’ variables.
mean sd min p1 p25 p50 p75 p99 max
Cash Dist. 73.89 601.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.14 1503.00 67643.80
Dividends 47.02 389.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.04 982.00 67643.80
Shares Buy. 23.64 313.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 461.59 34420.00
TFP 1.21 2.23 0.00 0.13 0.82 1.03 1.28 4.21 283.51
Market Cap. 2256.37 13201.11 0.00 0.67 21.74 107.18 619.62 43294.66 1819781.88
CAPEX 148.67 977.18 -401.61 0.00 0.77 5.20 34.44 2760.00 65028.00
RD 85.50 487.32 -0.55 0.00 0.19 2.72 17.11 2015.00 14035.29
Assets 2200.24 13328.37 0.50 0.98 20.94 106.47 601.96 39042.00 797769.00
Cash 212.67 1406.27 -40.00 0.00 1.25 8.54 52.37 4007.00 91052.00
Net Income 91.63 1056.33 -98696.00 -353.71 -2.32 1.39 18.78 2285.29 125000.00
Debt 668.75 5355.19 0.00 0.00 1.67 16.85 168.75 11122.70 523762.00
Employees 9.21 37.64 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.85 4.35 144.78 2200.00
Table 5: Summary statistics of the unscaled data used to construct the dependent and independent
variables used in the various regressions: all cash variables are in millions of U.S. dollars, the number
of employees is in thousands, data for the 1980-2013 period.
growth indicators in figures 14 and 15. In addition, I present the complete results of the
logit regressions including all growth indicators results and explaining, respectively, the
propensity to return cash, to pay dividends and to buy shares back in figures 16 to 18.
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mean sd min p1 p25 p50 p75 p99 max
Cash Dist. 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.24 0.24
Dividend 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.12
Share Buy. 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.17
TFP 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.23 0.23
Market/Book 1.78 2.75 0.05 0.05 0.45 0.90 1.84 17.17 17.17
CAPEX 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.76 0.76
RD 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.72 0.72
Mkt. Cap. % 39.70 22.70 1.00 1.00 20.00 40.00 59.00 80.00 85.00
Assets 1513.10 4736.80 0.67 0.98 20.94 106.47 601.96 31001.40 31001.40
Cash 0.19 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.22 1.81 1.81
Net Income -0.04 0.28 -1.50 -1.50 -0.06 0.03 0.08 0.43 0.43
Debt 0.29 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.24 0.41 1.37 1.37
Employees 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.19
Table 6: Summary statistics of the scaled variables used in the regression models, data for the 1980-
2013 period.
Cash Dist. Div. Shares Buy. TFP Mkt/Book CAPEX R&D Mkt Cap. Assets Cash Net Inc. Debt Empl.
Cash Dist. 1.00 0.65 0.75 -0.13 -0.15 -0.07 -0.18 0.15 0.13 -0.12 0.13 -0.00 -0.03
Div. 0.65 1.00 0.05 -0.16 -0.14 -0.05 -0.21 0.24 0.19 -0.15 0.15 0.01 -0.02
Shares Buy. 0.75 0.05 1.00 -0.06 -0.10 -0.07 -0.10 0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.07 -0.02 -0.02
TFP -0.13 -0.16 -0.06 1.00 0.24 0.09 0.17 -0.47 -0.17 0.20 0.07 -0.01 0.24
Mkt/Book -0.15 -0.14 -0.10 0.24 1.00 0.25 0.50 0.15 -0.07 0.63 -0.21 -0.06 0.10
CAPEX -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 0.09 0.25 1.00 0.09 0.08 -0.04 0.13 -0.01 0.26 0.17
R&D -0.18 -0.21 -0.10 0.17 0.50 0.09 1.00 -0.08 -0.12 0.58 -0.50 -0.16 -0.08
Mkt. Cap. 0.15 0.24 0.05 -0.47 0.15 0.08 -0.08 1.00 0.46 0.02 0.27 0.02 -0.12
Assets 0.13 0.19 0.05 -0.17 -0.07 -0.04 -0.12 0.46 1.00 -0.09 0.10 0.03 -0.15
Cash -0.12 -0.15 -0.06 0.20 0.63 0.13 0.58 0.02 -0.09 1.00 -0.24 -0.14 0.04
Net Inc. 0.13 0.15 0.07 0.07 -0.21 -0.01 -0.50 0.27 0.10 -0.24 1.00 -0.02 0.06
Debt -0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.26 -0.16 0.02 0.03 -0.14 -0.02 1.00 0.09
Empl. -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.24 0.10 0.17 -0.08 -0.12 -0.15 0.04 0.06 0.09 1.00
Table 7: Correlation matrix of regressions’ variables (1980-2013).
B.4 Tests
The studied dependent variables follow strongly persistent processes. Failing to correct for
such persistence can cause serial correlation tests to fail. I present the serial correlation
test in table 9. The tests show that serial correlation is either statistically insignificant or
too low to seriously affect the result of the regressions.
Running dynamic panel data models for a large number of units and a small number
of observations per unit comes with the issue of a biased estimate of the coefficient of the
lagged dependent variables. The absence of an important serial correlation in the error
terms provides an indication that there is little underestimation of the lagged variables
coefficient if any. To gain more confidence around this issue, regressions are run where the
number of observations per firm is unrestricted, is required to be higher than 30 (T ≥ 30)
(table 10) . The results show that, as expected by the theory, a low number of observation
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Full Model TFP Effect Market/Book Effect Investment Effect
L.Dist. Cash 0.0830∗∗∗ 0.0939∗∗∗ 0.0839∗∗∗ 0.0938∗∗∗
L2.Dist. Cash 0.00819 0.0120 0.00882 0.0105




L.MArket Cap. percentile 0.000208∗∗∗ -0.0000430 0.000230∗∗∗ 0.0000208
L.Assets 0.000000425∗∗∗ 0.000000573∗∗∗ 0.000000413∗∗∗ 0.000000510∗∗∗
L.Cash 0.0323∗∗∗ 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0221∗∗∗
L.Net Income 0.0199∗∗∗ 0.00491 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.00305
L.Debt -0.0170∗∗∗ -0.0184∗∗∗ -0.0182∗∗∗ -0.0163∗∗∗
L.Employees -0.218∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗
Constant 0.0328∗∗∗ 0.0418∗∗∗ 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗
AIC -201928.0 -201460.3 -201897.9 -201460.1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 8: Dynamic two way fixed effect model FE model explaining the size of distributed cash, no exclusion of
firms based on the number of observations.
per unit leads to underestimating the autoregressive coefficients. The differences in the
lagged dependent variables estimates remain small when increasing the minimum number
of observations per firm from 15 to 30.
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Cash Dist. Resid. Div. Resid. Shares Buy. Resid.
L.residuals -0.0234∗ -0.0189 0.0173
L2.residuals -0.0176 -0.00106 0.0215∗
L3.residuals -0.0184 -0.00385 -0.00282
L4.residuals -0.0150 -0.00580 -0.0132
L5.residuals -0.0263∗∗ -0.0153 -0.0220∗∗
L6.residuals -0.0201∗ -0.000362 -0.00750
L7.residuals -0.0178∗ 0.00615 -0.0253∗∗
Constant 0.000251∗∗∗ -0.000524∗∗∗ -0.0128∗∗∗
Observations 20660 20660 20738
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 9: Autocorrelation tests (Full Models).
Cash Dist T ≥ 15 T ≥ 30 Div T≥ 15 T ≥ 30 Share Buy ≥ 15 T ≥ 30
L.Dist. Cash 0.083∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.0079) (0.010) (0.017)
L2.Dist. Cash 0.0082 0.044∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.0068) (0.0080) (0.013)
L3.Dist. Cash 0.0027 0.042∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.0071) (0.0083) (0.015)
L.Dividends 0.37∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.017) (0.033)
L2.Dividends 0.066∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.027)
L3.Dividends 0.027∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗
(0.0085) (0.010) (0.021)
L.Share Buybacks 0.028∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.014) (0.023)
L2.Share Buybacks -0.032∗∗∗ -0.0024 0.016
(0.0098) (0.013) (0.020)
L3.Share Buybacks -0.023∗ 0.026 0.018
(0.011) (0.014) (0.019)
Observations 53104 25298 8971 39786 23474 8902 29393 12282 4474
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 10: Lagged dependent variables tests. The lagged variables coefficients from the model
including all firms are shown next to estimates of the same coefficients from a models excluding
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Figure 14: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries corresponding
to the effects of TFP, Market/Book and investment variables (CAPEX and R&D) on the firm’s propensity to
pay shareholders through dividends. The logit regressions are repeated for every year from 1980 to 2013. The
TFP marginal effect is estimated without controlling for Market/Book, CAPEX and R&D, The Market/Book
marginal effect is estimated without controlling for TFP, CAPEX and R&D and the CAPEX and R&D effects
are estimated in the same repeated regressions that exclude both TFP and Market/Book. Controls common to
all regressions include: market capitalisation, assets, cash, net income, debt and the number of employees. Grey
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Figure 15: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries
corresponding to the effects of TFP, Market/Book and investment variables (CAPEX and R&D)
on the firm’s propensity to pay shareholders through share buybacks. The logit regressions
are repeated for every year from 1980 to 2013. The TFP marginal effect is estimated without
controlling for Market/Book, CAPEX and R&D, The Market/Book marginal effect is estimated
without controlling for TFP, CAPEX and R&D and the CAPEX and R&D effects are estimated
in the same repeated regressions that exclude both TFP and Market/Book. Controls common
to all regressions include: market capitalisation, assets, cash, net income, debt and the number










1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
year







1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
year







1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
year











1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
year














1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
year






1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
year
Cash estimate 95% lower limit
95% upper limit
Figure 16: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries for the full model
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Figure 16: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries for the full model
explaining the distributed cash.
Full Model TFP Effect Market/Book Effect Investment Effect
L.Dividends 0.467∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗
L2.Dividends 0.0888∗∗∗ 0.0889∗∗∗ 0.0882∗∗∗ 0.0892∗∗∗




L.Market Cap. percentile 0.000115∗∗∗ 0.0000685∗∗ 0.000121∗∗∗ 0.0000769∗∗∗
L.Assets 8.34e-08∗∗∗ 0.000000101∗∗∗ 7.69e-08∗∗ 9.52e-08∗∗∗
L.Cash 0.00437∗∗ 0.00335∗ 0.00417∗∗ 0.00331∗
L.Net Income 0.00501 -0.00102 0.00504 -0.00204
L.Debt -0.00129 -0.00103 -0.00108 -0.00111
L.Employees -0.0396∗ -0.0482∗∗ -0.0381∗ -0.0490∗∗
Constant 0.00388∗ 0.00562∗∗∗ 0.00365∗ 0.00501∗∗
AIC -144153.6 -144041.2 -144151.5 -144036.0
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 17: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries for the full model
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Figure 17: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries for the full model
explaining the propensity to pay dividends.
Full Model TFP Effect Market/Book Effect Investment Effect
L.Shares Buybacks 0.116∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
L2.Shares Buybacks -0.00244 0.000751 -0.00152 -0.000444




L.Market Cap. percentile 0.000110 -0.0000460 0.0000927 -0.0000310
L.Assets 0.000000254∗∗ 0.000000376∗∗∗ 0.000000276∗∗ 0.000000352∗∗∗
L.Cash 0.0301∗∗∗ 0.0257∗∗∗ 0.0310∗∗∗ 0.0251∗∗∗
L.Net Income 0.00510 -0.0160∗ 0.00344 -0.0113
L.Debt -0.0201∗∗∗ -0.0214∗∗∗ -0.0216∗∗∗ -0.0193∗∗∗
L.Employees -0.272∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗ -0.298∗∗∗
Constant 0.0273∗∗∗ 0.0327∗∗∗ 0.0275∗∗∗ 0.0331∗∗∗
AIC -49301.8 -49219.3 -49295.4 -49236.4
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 18: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries for the full model
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Figure 18: Repeated logit cross-section regressions estimates with 95% confidence boundaries for the full model
explaining share buybacks.
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